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Abstract. Text passwords are the ubiquitous method of authentication, used by 
most people for most online services. Many people choose weak passwords that 
are vulnerable to attackers who simply guess all the passwords within the most 
probable password spaces. This paper describes a lightweight password creation 
mechanism that uses Persuasive Technology to influence users to create 
stronger passwords. Results from a pilot study show that our Persuasive Text 
Passwords (PTP) prototype system successfully influenced users to create and 
remember more secure passwords. 
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1   Introduction 
Online privacy and security relies heavily on authentication through textual 
passwords chosen by the users themselves. However, it is known that many users 
select weak passwords [5] that are vulnerable to automated attacks that systematically 
guess passwords and subsequently compromise users’ account resources, privileges, 
and data. It is crucial that users create secure passwords, lest their online bank 
accounts be stolen, their electronic communications (e-mail, messengers, etc.) become 
monitored and manipulated, and their personal information be used for identity fraud. 
Many security professionals have attributed the problem of weak passwords to a 
lack of user effort and motivation. However, Adams & Sasse [1] indicate that users 
create insecure passwords due not to a lack of motivation, but to misunderstanding the 
security threats, as well as how to effectively defend themselves with the provided 
mechanisms. Sadly, even when armed with such knowledge, limitations of human 
memory render users largely incapable of effectively using standard passwords [12]. 
In this paper, we consider how principles of Persuasive Technology (PT) [6] can 
help users create stronger text passwords that are nonetheless memorable. We first 
describe the background research on password choice and basic issues in evaluating 
password security. We present our Persuasive Text Passwords prototype system and explain how applied PT principles influence users to create more secure passwords. 
Finally, we describe our pilot study, report on the results, and offer our conclusions. 
2   Background 
Some recent attempts to instruct users on creating strong but memorable passwords 
have been in the form of mnemonic phrase-based passwords: memorable phrases 
abbreviated into passwords. Yan et al. [18] found mnemonic passwords to be as 
secure as random passwords and more secure than normal passwords. However, Kuo 
et al. [9] found that most mnemonic passwords were based on phrases from external 
sources and were only as secure as regular passwords given the authors’ attack model.  
When creating accounts on the Internet, many websites offer advice on creating 
secure passwords through general suggestions or high-level feedback in the form of 
“strength meters”. Furnell [7] discovered a lack of consistency and effectiveness 
across password requirements and advice provided by 10 popular websites. 
Apparently such advice has little effect, as recent findings by Florencio and Herley 
[5] show the majority of over 500,000 Internet users’ online passwords (including for 
PayPal) consist solely of lowercase characters. Although memorability was not 
discussed, users created stronger passwords when one service provider imposed 
strength requirements. The authors also noted password re-use, averaging at about 
3.22 website accounts per password. Thus, even when password instructions and 
memorability aids are readily available, users continue to behave insecurely. 
Weirich and Sasse [16] assert that, for password security to be effective, users must 
exert extra effort in creating secure passwords. They further discussed reasons why 
conventional fear appeals fail to motivate users to behave securely. The authors 
propose  persuading users to “buy-in” to a security-centred culture. They mainly 
employ user-centred design theory in their discussion of persuasion. 
2.1 Persuasive Authentication Framework 
More recently, Fogg [6] has presented Persuasive Technology (PT) as “interactive 
computing systems designed to change people’s attitudes and behaviours”. PT is a set 
of tools, media, and cues which technological solutions may implement to encourage 
users to behave in some desired manner. Persuasive tools assist users in 
accomplishing tasks more quickly and easily, persuasive media offer several 
representations by which messages are conveyed, and persuasive social cues endow 
products with friendly, knowledgeable, and trustworthy attributes. 
Numerous persuasion strategies are associated with each of the three 
aforementioned persuasive roles. The persuasive goals, topic, medium, audience, and 
desired persuasive strength determine which persuasion strategies should be 
employed. PT has successfully produced desired behaviour changes in many domains, 
such as health [8, 15] and education [10].  
PT is purposefully generalised so it may be used in any domain, but some PT 
theory does not readily apply to the unique challenges of usable security. 
 1. Security is a secondary task [17]; users will bypass any security measure which 
impedes them from completing their primary task. 
2. Security systems are complex, making it difficult for users to form proper 
mental models [4]. Users may not even realise their behaviour puts them and 
others at risk or may underestimate the consequences of behaving insecurely. 
3. Computer security must deal with the “barn door” property [17]; should private 
information be exposed even for a brief moment, it is impossible to guarantee 
that it has not been compromised by an attacker. 
4. Users tend to concern themselves with privacy and security only when its impact 
on their lives is blatantly obvious [13]. Regrettably, this typically occurs no 
sooner than when users’ security and privacy has already been breached. 
 
Fig. 1 The Persuasive Authentication Framework [3] 
The Persuasive Authentication Framework [3] (Fig. 1) has recently been proposed. 
It condenses PT into five key principles that are applicable to the challenges of usable 
security and authentication. Each principle draws on various PT tools and cues. 
Simplification. Authentication tasks should be made as simple as possible. This can 
be achieved by ensuring the authentication process is reduced to as few steps as 
possible and is tunnelled to ensure users make secure choices when using the system. 
Personalisation. Since customised information is more persuasive than generic 
advice, tailoring the authentication process for users can persuade them to behave 
more securely. Greater persuasive power can result from offering personalised 
security suggestions at the most opportune moment. 
Monitoring. Users may be more likely to behave securely if they know security 
administrators perform routine surveillance on their passwords. If the results of 
security analyses on users’ passwords are visible to users (like password strength 
meters), they can self-monitor and adjust their behaviour to be more secure. 
Conditioning. Users typically underestimate the threats and risks to their online 
accounts, and thus do not believe behaving securely is necessary. By applying various 
forms of reinforcement conditioning to synthetically encourage the correct behaviour, 
we can help shape the desired secure behaviour or turn existing behaviour into habits.  Social Interaction. Establishing a common rapport with users by emulating their 
physical,  psychological, and language characteristics can make an authentication 
system more persuasive. Additional persuasion can be leveraged from social 
dynamics, such as thanking the user for behaving securely, and social roles, by using 
statements such as, “One weak link in the security chain is all it needs to break.” 
2.2   Password Space 
Two fundamental concepts must be distinguished when evaluating the security of any 
authentication system. The first is the theoretical password space (TPS) size: the 
number of unique passwords users could theoretically choose in a given system. The 
TPS size is determined only by technical constraints independent of such factors as 
user-choice. Two main constraints in text passwords are the number of unique 
characters available on the keyboard, and any password character length limits. 
The second concept is the effective password space (EPS): the number of 
passwords in the TPS that are likely to be chosen by real-world users. Clearly, the 
EPS can never be larger than the TPS. An ideal security system will have an EPS too 
large for an attacker to exhaustively guess in a reasonable amount of time. 
Text passwords have a reasonably large TPS for passwords of sufficient length. 
They would be reasonably secure against guessing attacks if users chose passwords 
randomly and with equal probability. However, most users do not choose from the 95 
English U.S. keyboard characters with equal probability. To simplify discussion, we 
consider 8-character passwords, since the arguments extend for longer passwords. 
The TPS size is the number of all possible 8-character passwords: 95
8 ≈ 6.6 · 10
15. 
Table 1 shows the growth in number of passwords as the password space character 
set becomes larger by using characters from different subsets, such as lower- and 
uppercase letters, digits, and symbols. We note Table 1 presents optimistic figures 
that do not account for biases towards dictionary words or commonly-used character 
patterns, which attackers readily exploit with cracking tools like John the Ripper [14].  
Note the significant increase in password space size when all four character subsets 
are used. Such exponential jumps are well-recognized in the computer security field, 
and security estimates are typically expressed in base-2 logarithms [2], shown in the 
estimated bits of security column of Table 1. This security estimate naïvely assumes 
password characters are randomly chosen within their space. However, it is useful for 
coarse relative comparison. It is much harder to find a password amongst 95
8 ≈ 6.6 · 
10
15 others than it is to find amongst 26
8 ≈ 2.0 · 10
11. Still, users continue to select 
passwords from small subspaces of the TPS, making attackers’ guesswork less costly. 
Table 1. A comparison of password spaces across various 8-character password subsets. 
Password space subset  Passwords in subset  % of TPS  Estimated Bits of Security (log2) 
Lowercase  26
8 ≈ 2.0 · 10
11  0.003 37.6 
Lowercase & digits  36
8 ≈ 2.8 · 10
12  0.043 41.4 
Mixed case  52
8 ≈ 5.4 · 10
13  0.806 45.6 
Alphanumeric  62
8 ≈ 2.2 · 10
14  3.291 47.6 
Alphanumeric & symbols  95
8 ≈ 6.6 · 10
15  100 52.6 We propose improving the security of passwords by increasing the probability that 
users will create passwords in larger password spaces, and therefore requiring much 
more effort for an attacker to guess. Although this would be an improvement, we 
must be clear that this approach only improves security against guessing attacks, and 
does not address attacks such as surreptitious installation of keyloggers, other 
“malware” on users’ machines, or social strategies such as “phishing” whereby users 
are tricked into revealing their passwords. We also note that the strategy of increasing 
the effective password space is the basis for other existing strategies [9, 18]. The 
difference in our approach is that we propose to use Persuasive Technology. 
3   Persuasive Text Passwords 
Traditional approaches to increasing the effective password space for text passwords 
involve either advice or prescription. Password advice approaches include education 
through the publication of guidelines, as well as general feedback on the user-chosen 
passwords’ strength. Approaches using prescription include enforced rules for 
password creation and system-generated passwords with no user choice whatsoever. 
As discussed in Section 2 these approaches are problematic, as advice is often ignored 
and prescription leads to frustration and poor password memorability. 
Our general approach is a password creation system involving both user choice and 
a persuasive system-chosen improvement. The user may accept the improvement or 
shuffle for an alternative improvement. Our approach uses Persuasive Technology 
(PT) as a middle path between advice and prescription. As an active part of the 
password creation process, we hope this approach will be more effective than mere 
passive advice. Additionally, user involvement in the creation process should result in 
memorable passwords. The amount of PT employed is admittedly modest, but we 
wish to assess its impact before incorporating any additional persuasive strategies. 
3.1 Variations of Persuasive Text Passwords 
To explore this password-improvement approach, we designed three Persuasive Text 
Passwords (PTP) mechanisms, which randomly place between two and four 
randomly-chosen characters in users’ passwords. All three mechanisms allowed users 
to press a shuffle button, causing the system to assign a new set of randomly chosen 
and positioned characters to the users’ passwords. All improved passwords contained 
at least eight characters. See Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 for an example of the PTP system. We 
developed and implemented the following three Persuasive Text Passwords 
variations.  
Preload. The system-assigned characters were randomly-chosen and positioned 
within the first eight character slots before the users began creating their password. In 
essence, the users created their password around the system-chosen characters. 
  
Fig. 2 A screenshot example of a user choosing "persuasion" as their original password in the 
Persuasive Text Passwords system 
 
Fig. 3 A screenshot example of a user re-entering their Insert-improved password into the 
Persuasive Text Passwords system 
Replace. As per a typical password system, users first chose their own password. The 
system then replaced two to four random characters in the password with new 
randomly-chosen ones. 
Insert. After users chose their password, two to four random characters were inserted 
into the password at random positions. A screenshot of the Insert condition is shown 
in Fig. 3. 
 
All 3 variations leverage these Persuasive Authentication Framework [3] principles. Simplification. Since the PTP system takes on the responsibility of ensuring the 
password is secure, users can focus on making their password memorable, thereby 
simplifying the password creation task. Furthermore, the users’ “path-of-least-
resistance” is to comply with the system’s initial suggestion, which is more secure 
than shuffling until a weaker set of characters (such as all lowercase characters) are 
found. Thus, when creating a new password, PTP makes the most secure choice the 
least burdensome; many other password schemes lack this property. 
Conditioning. Shuffling repeatedly to find a specific set of system-assigned 
characters can be tedious. The PTP system makes less secure choices less attractive, 
hence guiding users away from poor security decisions. 
Personalisation. Since the system-assigned characters are placed in a user-chosen 
password, users are likely to feel a kinship towards their password and thus are more 
likely to comply with the system’s suggestions. Furthermore, we expect users are 
most likely to be open to password suggestions when creating one. Thus, PTP applies 
its persuasion at the most opportune moment. The persuasion may also develop their 
mental model of secure passwords, potentially leading them to apply the PTP random-
character placement scheme to their other passwords. 
3.2 Usability Pre-Testing 
Before conducting the pilot study, we first performed some informal usability pre-
tests with six participants to uncover the most prominent usability issues. The 
following list describes the identified problems and the solutions we adopted. 
Repeating Characters. Users would often repeat the system-assigned characters 
when creating a Preload password. For example, if the system presented the users 
with “_ _ B _ _ # _ 8”, they were likely to choose a password similar to “BBB###88”. 
Since the lack of distinct characters makes such passwords very insecure, we chose 
not to test the Preload variant in this pilot study. 
Character Minimisation. Users would shuffle until the system placed only two 
randomly chosen characters into the password. Memorability seemed to suffer the few 
times users created passwords with three or four system-assigned characters. 
Therefore, we chose to examine only placing two characters for this pilot study. 
Indistinguishable Characters. Certain system-chosen characters were difficult for 
users to tell apart, such as the grave accent (`) and the apostrophe (‘), or the lowercase 
“L” and the vertical line (|). To avoid such confounds in our pilot study, we removed 
the uncommon characters (the grave accent and vertical line) from PTP’s set of 
system-selectable characters. The small loss in security due to removing the 
characters is worth avoiding possible user error, confusion, and frustration. Character Memorability. Users had difficulty identifying the position and case of 
their password’s system-chosen characters when confirming and logging in. Although 
their password was visible during creation, it was masked with asterisks (*) when 
confirming and logging in. To assist users in learning their passwords, the pilot study 
asks user to re-type their password unmasked (shown in Fig. 3) during the password 
creation phase. This additional step allows users to practice typing their entire 
password while visually verifying that the characters they type are correct. This 
assumes PTP passwords are created only in environments free of shoulder-surfing, 
where potential attackers can observe users entering their passwords. 
3.3 Pilot User Study 
The following pilot lab study procedures were evaluated and approved by our 
University’s Ethics Committee for Psychological Research. We used a between-
subjects design; 7 participants tested the Replace PTP variant and 8 others tested 
Insert. All were university students; 8 studying Computer Science and others from 
various disciplines. All used computers, the Internet, and passwords regularly. Data 
was collected from a total of 154 trials. Each participant completed 10 or more trials, 
each consisting of creating, confirming, and logging in with a password. Users also 
filled out a demographics and user-opinion questionnaire during the session. 
The Persuasive Text Passwords system logged users’ actions and passwords. When 
introducing participants to the system, they were told to pretend the passwords they 
created would be protecting their online bank accounts, and therefore to choose 
passwords that would be hard for others to guess but were still memorable. They were 
told the password system’s improvements would help them create more secure 
passwords, but that they may shuffle as often as they liked to find system-chosen 
character combinations they preferred. Participants performed a practice trial to 
familiarise themselves with creating passwords in this new way. These practice trials 
are not included in the 154 total trials. Each trial consisted of the following phases. 
Create a Password. Users would compose a password of at least 8 characters 
according to their randomly-assigned condition (Insert or Replace). Users then re-
typed their improved password (with the system-assigned characters) to ensure they 
could correctly identify the characters in their password. In this phase, the password 
was visible in order for users to identify the system-assigned characters and 
accurately re-type them. Users could press a shuffle button to randomly change the 
system-assigned characters and positions. See Fig. 3 for a password creation example. 
Confirm a Password. Users re-entered their password, improved with the previously 
system-chosen characters. The echoed password was visually masked by asterisks (*). 
If they were unsuccessful, they could try to confirm again. If they could not remember 
their password, they could move on to the next trial and create a new password. 
Answer Two Questions. Users answered two 10-point Likert scale questions gauging 
the perceived password creation difficulty and predicted memorability after one week. Distraction Task. For 45 seconds, users counted backwards in threes, beginning from 
a randomly-chosen four digit number (e.g. 4372, 4369, 4366, etc.). This was intended 
to clear their textual working memory [11] and simulate a longer passage of time. 
Log In. Users logged in by retyping their improved password. The echoed password 
was again visually masked by asterisks (*). Similar to the Confirm phase, they could 
retry if they were unsuccessful. If users could not remember their password, they 
could skip this trial and begin creating a new password for the next trial. 
3.4 Results 
In considering the pilot study’s results, we adhere to the twin goals of usable security. 
We must care for usability; the system should be easy to use for the purpose intended. 
In this case, created passwords must be memorable, and the creation process should 
not be time-consuming. However, the system should also accomplish the security 
goals. In this case, the resulting passwords should be sufficiently stronger than those 
originally chosen by the user. We now address both these issues.  
Memorability. How memorable were the passwords? 
Out of the 154 total trials where users created passwords, 145 (94%) resulted in a 
successful confirm, of which 132 (86%) was on the first attempt. Of the former 145 
successful confirmations, 141 (97%) also resulted in a successful login, of which 128 
(88%) were on the first attempt. Pearson's chi-squared tests revealed no significant 
distinction between the Insert and Replace conditions. Although our method did not 
test long-term memorability, the cognitive load was substantial due to the many 
passwords being created. Overall, we feel these results suggest a reasonable level of 
memorability, but warrants further testing. 
Times. How long did it take to create passwords, confirm them, and login? 
To create a password, users took a mean and median of 66 and 58 seconds, with a 
standard deviation of 31 seconds. This includes the time to construct an initial 
password, shuffle as much as desired, and re-enter the improved password. The mean 
times to confirm and login were 15 and 14 seconds respectively. A regression analysis 
showed login times became shorter as users completed more trials. Two sample t-tests 
revealed no significant distinction between Insert and Replace. We believe these 
times are acceptable as a starting point and are likely to decrease with daily use. 
Shuffles. How often did users shuffle improved password suggestions? 
Over all 154 trials, the mean number of shuffles per trial was 8, and the median 
was 3. Our observations suggest that most users shuffled until they found an 
improved password they felt was memorable. However, users were often persuaded to 
comply with the first system-suggestion, as they did not shuffle at all in 41 of 154 
trials. T-tests revealed no significant distinction between Insert and Replace. Perception. What opinions did users report about the usability and security of PTP? 
Our post-test user-opinion questionnaire asked users to answer several questions, 
some reversed to avoid bias, on 10-point Likert scales. The main results are as 
follows, showing median responses. Users felt the new system was slower (4), that 
they would prefer a normal system if they were in a hurry (4), and that they would 
find the passwords more difficult to remember (4). However, they did feel the system 
was more secure than ordinary passwords (8), led to passwords that would be more 
difficult to guess (8), and with practice, they could get used to the system (8). These 
results seem reasonable for a new authentication system, and reflect a trade-off we 
would expect. We note that participant responses may be biased from being told the 
system’s improvement would make their password more secure. Although we believe 
such a statement would be made if the system were deployed, we plan to test user 
acceptance of PTP when it is not introduced as a security improvement. Chi-squared 
tests revealed no significant distinction between Insert and Replace. 
Security. Did the system help users create more secure passwords? 
Table 2 shows the system’s effect on password security by describing the nature of 
both the pre- and post-improvement passwords. For example, our improvement 
process reduced the proportion of very weak lowercase alphabetic passwords from 
20.8% to 4.5%. The proportion of very strong passwords that included lowercase, 
uppercase, numeric, and special characters rose from 14.3% to 29.9%. Most 
passwords were improved to include characters from additional character subsets. 
Fig. 4 compares the distribution users’ original and improved passwords’ estimated 
bits of security (see Section 2.2). Each box denotes the 2
nd and 3
rd quartiles, divided 
by the bold line noting the median. The whiskers at each of the boxes’ extremities 
show the 1
st and 4
th quartiles. The groups are statistically different if the notches in 
both boxes do not overlap. T-tests confirm the improved passwords were statistically 
stronger across all participants (t(306) = -5.0532, p < .001), and within both the Insert 
(t(164) = -4.7548, p < .001) and Replace (t(140) = -2.5138, p < .05) conditions. Thus, 
PTP influenced users to create passwords more difficult for attackers to guess. 
Our user sample consisted of approximately half Computer Science (CS) students, 
and it appears these participants formed a distinct group. For example, 12% of CS 
students chose original passwords in all lowercase, while 30% of the other students 
did the same. The possibility for improvement was therefore reduced for CS students. 
Since such technical expertise was over-represented in our sample, we expect that the 
general impact of our approach would likely be greater than our study results suggest. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Box plot of a relative bits of security estimate of users' original and improved passwords Table 2. Proportions of users' original and improved passwords across four character subsets 
Character Subsets  % of Original Passwords  % of Improved Passwords 
All lowercase  20.8%  4.5% 
All uppercase  0.6%  0.0% 
All numeric  0.0%  0.0% 
All special  0.0%  0.0% 
Lowercase & uppercase  1.3%  5.8% 
Lowercase & numeric  26.6%  5.8% 
Lowercase & special  5.9%  7.2% 
Uppercase & numeric  2.0%  0.0% 
Uppercase & special  2.6%  0.0% 
Numeric & special  0.6%  0.0% 
Lowercase, uppercase, & numeric  14.3%  16.9% 
Lowercase, uppercase, & special  3.2%  9.7% 
Lowercase, numeric, & special  7.8%  16.9% 
Uppercase, numeric, & special  0.0%  3.3% 
All four character subsets  14.3%  29.9% 
Passwords in 1 subset  21.4%  4.5% 
Passwords in 2 subsets  39.0%  18.8% 
Passwords in 3 subsets  25.3%  46.8% 
Passwords in 4 subsets  14.3%  29.9% 
4   Conclusion 
In this paper, we have outlined how Persuasive Technology can be used to improve 
passwords by reducing the likelihood that passwords can be guessed systematically, 
and thus increasing the security of users’ online accounts (and the accompanying 
resources and capabilities thereof). Although the approach described in this paper 
uses a modest number of PT strategies, it yields a useful improvement in password 
strength, and we therefore believe the approach is worth further study. 
Generalised advice and feedback have had limited success in helping users create 
more secure passwords. The main advantage of our approach is that it increases 
password strength while promoting password memorability through user involvement.  
Our approach involves altering only the password creation step in the 
authentication process. Thus, PTP should be easily integrated with most password 
systems since it only requires minor modifications to the end-user interface and no 
changes to the password server. Moreover, the visibility of how passwords are made 
more secure can help form users’ mental models of stronger passwords, which may 
lead them to create stronger passwords where our approach is not built-in. 
Our immediate future work involves three lines of inquiry. We wish to expand our 
study with participants more typical of the online population, compare our results to a 
control group, and test password memorability over longer periods of time as well as 
with more system-assigned characters. Secondly, we wish to refine our improvement 
strategy with regard to well-known patterns of systematic guessing, such as words, 
names, and other character patterns. Finally, we plan to increase the level of 
persuasion involved, leveraging more PT strategies.  References 
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